TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword
Introduction
Historical background
Analysis of Rumania’s nationality policy
1. Soviet influence on post-W.W. II Rumanian nationality policy
a) The Sovietization of Rumanian nationality policy
b) The reassertion of Rumanian nationalism: a reaction to Soviet influence
2. The nationality policy of the Ceausescu regime
a) The intensification of nationalism
b) Cultural discrimination
c) Socio-economic discrimination
d) Political discrimination
e) Statistical discrimination
f) The Rumanian propaganda campaign
g) The effects of Rumanian nationality policy
3. Determining factors in Rumanian nationality policy
a) Legitimacy
b) Historical factors - territorial integrity
c) Hungarian-Rumanian relations and the nationality question: the Hungarian position relative to the Transylvanian Question
d) The Soviet-Hungarian-Rumanian triangle
e) Political and ideological factors: legitimization through nationalism
f) Economic factors
g) Official Rumanian history: policy justification
4. The Hungarian-Rumanian conflict and the anti-Hungarian bias
a) Origins of the Hungarian-Rumanian conflict
b) Anti-Hungarian bias
The legal status of the Transylvanian Hungarian minority
Appendix A - Transylvanian demographic trends
Appendix B - Tables and maps
Conclusion
Bibliography
FOREWORD
The objective of this study is the analysis of
the factors determining the present Rumanian regime's discriminatory treatment
of the approximatively 2.5 million Hungarians of Transylvania. Although the
Hungarian territories annexed by Rumania are generally designated under the
name of Transylvania, the historical principality of Transylvania comprises
only about half of those annexed territories. In the present study however, the
generally accepted use of the name Transylvania will be kept, that is all the
Hungarian territories annexed by Rumania after the two World Wars will be
included under this designation. It should also be noted that there are other
Hungarians living in parts of Rumania, outside of Transylvania, who are subject
to treatment similar to that of the Transylvanian Hungarians.
The present Rumanian regime promotes a
nationalistic Rumanian historical version in order to justify its
discriminatory nationality policy towards the Transylvanian Hungarians, thus
seeking legitimation through nationalism based on a biased historical interpretation
and directed against the Hungarians in particular. The problem of the
repressive treatment of the Transylvanian Hungarians by Rumania raises a
relatively little examined question: the falsification and distortion of
historical facts for ideological or political purposes. This phenomenon is not
unique to the Transylvanian Problem. It is a characteristic of many cases where
one group ( nation, race, religious sect, political organization, etc...) seeks
to dominate, exploit, or even exterminate another group, proclaiming its own
superiority and the other's inferiority, attempting to impose its culture,
religion, or political system on others, often resorting to propaganda using
pseudo-historical or pseudo-scientific arguments to justify such imperialistic
policies. The Transylvanian Problem represents therefore an aspect of a much
larger and complex question which overlaps and combines the fields of history
and politics, and which may not have received the attention it deserves, due to
the artificial separation of these two disciplines.
The problem presently under study centers upon
what is often referred to as the Transylvanian Problem, which is the source of
conflict and tension between Hungary and Rumania. The history of Transylvania
is an integral part of Hungarian history until the end of the First World War.
However, since the end of the XVIIIth c., the history of Transylvania is
increasingly dominated by the conflict between the Hungarians and the
Rumanians.
The two most important aspects of Transylvanian
history from the point of view of the present study are, firstly, the
chronological order of settlement in that region by various ethnic groups, and
secondly, the evolution of the relationship between the Hungarians and the
Rumanians. The importance of the first aspect lies in the fact that the
Hungarians and Rumanians have conflicting historical claims to Transylvania,
and the Rumanian regime uses its historical interpretation as justification for
its policy of forced assimilation against the Transylvanian Hungarians. The
second aspect is also important since the conflictual Hungarian-Rumanian
relationship is a contributing factor in Rumania's policy towards the Transylvanian Hungarians.
The repressive Rumanian policy of political,
legal, educational, and economic discrimination, of forced cultural
assimilation, of deportation, and propaganda campaigns against the Hungarians
is directly related to the official Rumanian historical version which seeks to
project a distorted and falsified image of the Hungarians. They are portrayed
as invading barbarians who are the enemies of the Rumanian people. They are
labeled as undesirable alien latecomers who threaten the security of Rumania
and who are also culturally inferior to the Rumanians. It is therefore assumed
that it is in the interest of the security of the Rumanian state to eliminate
this dangerous foreign element, assimilation being one option which, according
to the official Rumanian historical interpretation, is also beneficial for the
Hungarians since it raises their culture to a ‘higher (Rumanian) level'.
A typical illustration of how the official
Rumanian historical interpretation serves to justify the policy of assimilation
towards the Hungarian population is provided by the case of the Székelys and
the Csángós. Both are Hungarian ethnic groups, the former inhabiting
Transylvania, and the latter, Moldavia. According to the official Rumanian
historical version, these ethnic groups would be ‘Hungarianized' Rumanians
which must therefore be ‘de-Hungarianized' and ‘re-Rumanianized'. Any
opposition to or criticism of this policy from the part of Hungarians is
branded as ‘fascist' and ‘chauvinistic' by the Rumanian regime.
The Rumanian
regime exploits the fear of the possibility of territorial revision in favour
of Hungary, for which there is a historical precedent since Hungary recovered
temporarily part of Transylvania as a result of the 1940 Vienna Arbitration,
this threat being referred to as Hungarian ‘revanchism' and ‘revisionism’ by
the Rumanian regime. According to this interpretation, the presumed Hungarian
territorial claims against Rumania, which the latter considers to be
unjustified, would be further weakened if the Hungarian population of the
territories bordering on Hungary would be eliminated, either through
assimilation or deportation. Thus the Rumanianization of Transylvania is seen
and promoted as an essential policy aiming to secure Romania's hold on and
claim of historical right to those territories, while simultaneously
undermining the basis for any Hungarian claims to Transylvania.
The Hungarian state and the Hungarians of
Transylvania are therefore seen as posing a threat to the security and the
territorial integrity of the Rumanian state. Although the Rumanian regime uses
the threat of Hungarian revisionism as justification for its nationality
policy, this threat seems fictitious under the present conditions since there
is no irredentist movement in Transylvania and the post-WWII Hungarian regimes renounced all former territorial
claims.
Although human rights, including those which
provide for the preservation of an individual's ethnic identity, are recognized
and stated in the peace treaties ending the two World Wars, the UN charter, and
the Helsinki accord, which have been signed by Rumania, as well as in the
Rumanian constitution itself, the Transylvanian Hungarians are subjected to
considerable discrimination by the Rumanian authorities, in violation of their
clearly stated and supposedly garanteed human rights. The treatment of the
Hungarian ethnic group by the Rumanian regime has increased the tensions
between Hungary and Romania. Most major Western states as well as the former
Soviet Union have also criticized Rumania's nationality policy. Nevertheless,
the program of forced assimilation of the Transylvanian and Moldavian
Hungarians has been further intensified by the various Rumanian regimes,
despite their claims to the contrary in official publications and declarations.
There is a considerable discrepancy between claims and statements made for
foreign consumption, and actual implemented domestic policies. The actual
policies, which differ from official statements, indicate the real objective of
forced assimilation (cultural genocide, or ethnocide), and the methods
(cultural, political, economic, administrative) of Rumania's nationality policy
towards the Hungarians.
The situation of the Transylvanian and Moldavian Hungarians seems to be continuously deteriorating under the present Rumanian regime:
- closing of Hungarian schools and universities
- restrictions on Hungarian language publications, press, and media
- banning of the use of the Hungarian language in public and in the administration
- banning of the use of Hungarian place names
- destruction of Hungarian villages and forced relocation
- socio-economic discrimination and political under-representation of the Hungarians
- restrictions on the Hungarians' freedom of movement and contact with friends and relatives living abroad
- harassment, arbitrary detention, torture, and assassination of important members of the Hungarian community by the state security services
- intimidation of Hungarians who do not declare themselves as Rumanians in the national census, and falsification of official statistics
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of
this study is to examine the factors which have determined Rumanian policies
towards ethnic Hungarians since Rumania took over Transylvania at the end of
the First World War. The principal thesis which is to be demonstrated is that
various Rumanian regimes, particularly the communist regime (especially under
Ceaucescu), sought legitimacy and justification for their policies, thereby
prompting the official exploitation and promotion of Rumanian nationalism and
generating a discriminatory policy of forced assimilation, or ethnocide,
directed against the ethnic minorities in Rumania, including those of Hungarian
nationality. The Rumanian nationality policy therefore served to legitimize the
regime in power and this policy was justified by a nationalistic official
version of history which also depicted the Hungarians as a threat to Rumanian
national security and territorial integrity. The objective of the nationality
policy of the "unitary national Rumanian State" was therefore:
“to "Roumanize Transylvania" -
that is to secure for the
Roumanian element a position of
unquestioned superiority
... the political enemy in chief
consists of the Magyar
minority, whose power, influence, and
numbers must be
weakened by all possible means.” (1)
The primary
factors, both internal and external to Rumania, which will be examined are of
historical, political, and ideological nature. The various nationality policy
implementation methods employed by the Rumanian authorities will be used as
indicators in order to establish a chronological trend and to correlate
Rumanian nationality policy with internal and external factors. In this manner,
the fundamental causes and consequences of this problem will be determined.
The problem of
the treatment of ethnic Hungarians in Rumania is the result of a complex set of
factors with wide-ranging historical and political ramifications. This problem,
otherwise referred to as the Transylvanian Question, is therefore part of a
wider geopolitical context of interrelated problems of similar nature. The Transylvanian
Question is the central issue of Hungarian-Rumanian relations. It is a
seemingly irreconcilable and highly controversial territorial and ethnic
dispute with deep historical roots, both sides claiming exclusive rights for
the possession of Transylvania, accusing each other of having oppressed their
co-nationals living there, and denying each other's accusations. Thus, with
each side blaming the other for causing this problem, no solution has yet been
reached.
The Transylvanian
Question, or more specifically the issue of the Hungarian minority's situation,
is itself part of the Hungarian Question which refers to the problem of the
Hungarian minorities living in the states surrounding Hungary. At present,
there are an estimated 4-5 million ethnic Hungarians (official censuses
recognize approximately 3 million only)(2), representing approximately one
third of all ethnic Hungarians inhabiting the Carpathian Basin, living outside
of Hungary in the neighboring states as a result of the border changes which
have taken place following the two world wars.
The estimated 2.4
to 3 million Hungarians in Rumania (3) constitute the largest Hungarian
minority and have also been subjected to extremely harsh conditions as a result
of Rumanian nationality policy which was reported as being the most oppressive
compared to the other states neighboring Hungary, although these states are
also engaged, to varying degrees, in discriminatory policies towards ethnic
Hungarians. The Hungarian Question thus involves Hungary with Slovakia,
Ukraine, Rumania, the former Yugoslav states, and Austria, and each of these
states is also involved in other domestic ethnic problems and/or territorial
disputes with other states.
The Hungarian
Question is the product of historical ethnic conflicts, otherwise known as the
Nationality Question, which centered upon the clashing national aspirations of
the Hungarian and non-Hungarian ethnic groups of the Middle Danubian Basin. To
a considerable extent, this nationality problem has been generated by
intervening major external powers seeking to dominate the region by exploiting
the potential antagonisms among its nationalities. This problem has been
perpetuated and exacerbated by the conflicting interpretations of the history
of these nationalities. The mutually contradicting and often politically
influenced historical versions tend to distort the view these nationalities
have of each other, thus sowing discord among them and preventing the
resolution of their conflicts.
The problem of the
Transylvanian and Moldavian Hungarians raises the conflicting issues of
nationalism and of minority rights with which international relations have been
increasingly preoccupied since the 19th c. Nationalism and nationality problems
have been at the root of most major wars and revolutions which have
fundamentally altered the political configuration of Europe during the past two
hundred years, opposing the concept of the unitary nation-state to the concept
of cultural, territorial, and administrative autonomy for ethnic minorities.
The principle of state sovereignty is also in contradiction with the declared
universality of human rights, which are assumed to include minority rights as
well, hence the ineffectiveness of international agreements and guarantees for
the protection of national minorities in a system of sovereign states.
The present study
is a multi-disciplinary approach to the issue of the Transylvanian Hungarians.
The historical, political, legal, socio-economic, demographic, cultural, and ideological
aspects of this problem will be examined in order to provide as comprehensive a
view as possible, which is essential for the accuracy of this type of analysis.
Due to the nature
of the problem which is to be analyzed, the historical dimension seems to
occupy a preponderant role among the determining factors of the Transylvanian
Question. Thus, the historical background is of great importance for the
understanding of this problem and will examine the roots of the
Transylvanian
Question, focusing on Hungary's loss of Transylvania to Rumania, as this event
provides a unique insight into the origins of this problem and the factors
determining Rumanian nationality policy towards ethnic Hungarians.
Following the
historical background, the present study will then proceed with the analysis of
Rumanian nationality policy towards ethnic Hungarians. This analysis will
determine the objective and examine the methods of implementation of Rumanian
nationality policy in the cultural, socio-economic, political, and legal
fields, leading to the analysis of the factors determining this policy.
The international
and domestic legal status of the Transylvanian Hungarians will also be
examined, giving an account of the attempts to solve this problem through
formal legal measures, and of the reasons for their lack of success.
A demographic
section will also present statistical data in order to provide a picture of the
changing ethnic composition and distribution of Transylvania's population. This
change itself is an indicator of the historical roots of the Transylvanian
minority problem and of the Rumanian nationality policy.
By examining the
various aspects of the Transylvanian Hungarian minority problem, this thesis
will present a synthesis of the different positions relative to this problem.
Two main difficulties confront this task: the relative inaccessibility of
primary sources and of original documents (most of which are undisclosed
official records, and some may even have been destroyed) as well as the difficulty
in finding truly impartial expert opinions on the subject matter, be they
Hungarian, Rumanian, or "neutral" third party. Therefore, another
“obstacle to a fully documented study of minority problems in Transylvania is
the absence of sufficient reliable data.” (4)
With respect to
the question of source reliability, it should be pointed out that documents
published in Hungary or Rumania cannot be attributed with the same level of
objectivity and accuracy as some independent Western scholarly sources, due to
political and ideological factors. This seems to be particularly the case of
documents originating from Rumania, as they are characterized by
“a lack of credible statistical
information as well as
an overabundance of biased propaganda.”
(5)
Certain
designations used in this research paper require some clarification. The
geographical name of Transylvania, as it is most commonly understood today,
refers to all the territories annexed by Rumania from Hungary after W.W. I (103
903 km2)(6). These territories include historical Transylvania itself (57 804
km2)(7), and in addition, parts of other former Hungarian territories known as
Máramaros (Maramures), Szatmár (Satu Mare), Kőrös Vidék (Crisana), and the
Bánság (Banat). Transylvania will therefore be referred to in its present wider
geographical extent, unless otherwise specified. The name
"Transylvania" is the Latin translation of the original Hungarian
name "Erdély" from which the Rumanian name "Ardeal" is also
derived (8).
The name of
"Rumania" and the term "Rumanian" will be used rather than
"Romania" and "Romanian", except in direct quotations where
it is spelled with an "o" or "ou" instead of a
"u". Both "Rumania" and "Romania" are presently
in use, although "Rumania" represents the original version which has
been gradually displaced by the official "Romania" version. Prior to
the creation of the Rumanian state in 1859, the Rumanians referred to
themselves as "Rumini" (9).
Two divergent
historical conceptions underly the two different spellings. The name
"Romania" is based on the Daco-Roman theory of the origin of the
Rumanians (10), whereas "Rumania" is based on the more widely
accepted view that the Rumanians originate from the Balkans, "Rum"
being the designation given by the Turks to the Balkans (11). The
"Rumanian" designation itself has only been used since the 19th c.,
prior to that, the Rumanians were known as "Vlachs" or
"Wallachians" ("Oláh" in Hungarian)(12).
The origin and
the relationship of the "Hungarian" and "Magyar"
designations should also be clarified in order to avoid certain confusions. The
term "Hungar", from which the "Hungarian" designation is
derived, is a collective ethnic name meaning Hun people or tribe (13). Each
Hunnic tribe and tribal federation had a specific name: Kuman, Pecheneg,
Magyar, Bulgar, Avar, Khazar, etc... These names became more widely known after
the breakup of the political unity of the Huns, following Atilla's death in 453
A.D. Thus, the Székelys of Eastern Transylvania (who were there before the
Magyars)(14) and the Moldavian Csángós are also Hungarian ethnic groups, as
well as the Magyars themselves, although Rumanian historiography has claimed
that the Székelys and Csángós were "Hungarianized" Rumanians, as a
justification for the policy of forced assimilation (15).
Therefore,
Rumanian nationality policy towards ethnic Hungarians has been determined
essentially by the need for legitimization of the Rumanian state. This need for
legitimization was generated by historical, political, ideological, and
economic factors, which will be analyzed in the following chapters. In the
conclusions drawn from the analysis of these factors, a fundamental long-term
solution seems to be the revision of the distorted and mutually antagonistic
national historical perceptions of the peoples in question in order to help
resolve nationalistic rivalries. This would require decisions made at the
political level and the freedom for unbiased scientific historical research. A
possible key to the resolution of nationality problems seems to lie in the
newly emerging (or re-emerging) historical data which contradict the
established versions upon which the present ideologically biased national
identities and perceptions are based.
The position
taken in this study is that a defense of the case of the Transylvanian and
Moldavian Hungarians is
required in order to counterbalance the wide dissemination of anti-Hungarian
propaganda in the West by Rumanians and others, in which serious accusations
are directed against the Hungarians. The defense of this case will therefore
strive for an objective analysis of factual evidence and for the avoidance of
ideological bias.
NOTES
(1) MaCartney, C.
A., Hungary and her Successors, Oxford U. P., London, 1937, p. 285.
(2) David, Z., "Statistics:
The Hungarians and their Neighbors", in Borsody, S.,ed., The
Hungarians: A Divided Nation, Yale Center for International and Area
Studies, New Haven, 1988, p. 345.
(3) Amnesty
International, Romania, Amnesty International USA Publications, 1978, p.
35.
(4) International
Commission of Jurists, "The Hungarian Minority Problem in Rumania",
in Wagner, F. S., ed., Toward a New Central Europe, Danubian Press,
Astor, Fla., 1970, p. 327.
(5) Keefe, K. E.,
et al, Romania - A Country Study, The American University, Washington D.
C., 1979, p. v.
(6) Haraszti, E.,
The Ethnic History of Transylvania, Danubian Press, Astor, Fla., 1971,
p. 1.
(7) Ibid., p. 1.
(8) Ibid., p. 1.
(9) Cadzow, J.
F., et al, eds., Transylvania: The Roots of Ethnic Conflict, Kent State
U. P., Kent, Ohio, 1983, p. 4.
(10) Ibid., p. 4.
(11) Ibid., p. 5.
(12) Ibid., p. 5.
(13) Badiny, F.
J., ed., The Sumerian Wonder, School of Oriental Studies, University of
Salvador, Buenos Aires, 1974, p. 223.
Knatchbull, H., The
Political Evolution of the Hungarian Nation, Arno Press, New York, 1971, p.
4.
(14) Haraszti,
op. cit., pp. 35, 48.
Kopeczi, B., ed.,
Erdély Torténete, Akadémiai Kiado, Budapest, 1986, p. 292.
(15) MaCartney,
op. cit., p. 286.
Pascu, S., and
Stefanescu, S., eds., Un jeu dangereux: la falsification de l'histoire,
Éditions scientifiques et encyclopédiques, Bucarest, 1987, p. 244.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The importance of
the study of the Transylvanian Question's historical background lies in that it
demonstrates the origin and the role of the key factors which have determined
Rumanian nationality policy: the concern over the legitimacy and the permanence
of Rumanian territorial possessions, the interests and policies of major powers
relative to the area concerned, and the dissemination of anti-Hungarian
propaganda, which had a definite impact on the situation of the Hungarian
minorities.
The problem of
the Hungarian minorities was created by the Treaty of Trianon of June 4, 1920,
just as numerous other minority problems were created by the post-W. W. I
settlements imposed by the victorious Entente Powers. One of the critical
factors contributing to the plight of the ethnic minorities was that the
implementation of the minority rights protection clauses of the Peace Treaties
was inadequately guaranteed by the Entente Powers. As a result of the Treaty of
Trianon, Hungary lost 72% of its territory and 64% of its population (1), and
one third of the entire Magyar population was forced under foreign rule (2).
Therefore, the conditions imposed upon Hungary after W. W. I were by far
harsher in both relative and absolute terms than those imposed upon any other
state (3).
The terms of the
Treaty of Trianon were, however, largely determined by diplomatic events
leading up to and during the war, as well as by military events following it.
There is conclusive evidence that plans for the annexation of Hungarian
territories were envisaged well before the outbreak of the First World War by
the states which benefited from the partition of Hungary (4). The expansionist
aims of the Czechs, Serbia, and Rumania were manifested by the promotion of
separatist movements among the nationalities of Hungary (5) and by conducting a
highly publicized propaganda campaign in the West, with the collaboration of
certain influential personalities such as R. W. Seton-Watson (6), in order to
popularize their cause and to gain acceptance and support for their territorial
claims against Austria-Hungary:
“[Wickham] Steed, as the foreign policy
editor of the
Times, and Seton-Watson as the editor of New Europe...
used the press as weapons, often
arbitrarily and with
biased arguments, on behalf of the
imperialist objec-
tives of the Entente: the maximum
territorial claims
of the Slavs and the Romanians... Steed,
Seton-Watson,
and the officials and specialists,
including journalists
and politicians... contributed a great
deal to the pro-
cess of dissolution, to the fermentation
within the Mo-
narchy. The new order in Central Europe,
and the new
boundaries can be regarded largely as
the fruits of their
work before and after 1914.” (7)
Thus, the
propaganda campaign before and during the war had a definite impact upon the
political restructuring of the Danubian region (8).
Major powers,
such as Russia, seized the opportunities presented by the emergence of new
nationalistic small states such as Rumania, and exploited the latter's
territorial ambitions in order to serve their own hegemonistic objectives (9).
As a result, the Entente Powers recognized and supported territorial claims by
Balkan states against Austria-Hungary even before W. W. I (10). Serbia and
Rumania also realized that the territories they sought could only be obtained
through the intervention of major powers. Thus, the Balkan states were not
merely the pawns of the major powers, but they also exploited the latter's
imperialistic rivalries:
“each national disturbance presented
some of the Great
powers with an opportunity to further
their own interests
at the expense of others. Each
nationality that succeeded
in its struggle for independence did so
with at least
the tacit support if not open assistance
of one of the
Great powers. Those like the Poles and
Hungarians, who
lacked a powerful patron were
unsuccessful.” (11)
During the war
itself, through secret agreements, Hungarian territories were promised by the
Entente Powers to their Balkan allies. On August 17, 1916, the secret Treaty of
Bucharest was signed between the Entente and Rumania (12). The treaty promised
the Hungarian territories East of the Tisza river to Rumania, which, in
exchange, could not conclude a separate peace treaty with the Central Powers,
as this would invalidate the Bucharest Treaty (13). Consequently, the Rumanians turned against their former ally,
Austria-Hungary, and on August 27 proceeded to invade Transylvania, declaring
war upon the Dual Monarchy only after the attack had begun (14). The Rumanians
based their declaration of war on the claim that Hungary was oppressing its
Rumanian minority (15). Nevertheless, the Central Powers mounted a successful
counter-offensive as a result of which Rumania was forced to sign the Peace
Treaty of Bucharest on May 7, 1918, thereby invalidating the 1916 Bucharest
Treaty with the Entente (16).
On November 3,
1918, Austria-Hungary concluded an Armistice at Padua with Italy which had
received the mandate and authorization to act on behalf of the Allied and
Associated Powers (17). On that day, there were no Allied forces on Hungarian
territory (18). The Armistice designated the existent frontiers of
Austria-Hungary as the demarcation lines for the Balkan and Eastern fronts.
This Armistice was thus valid for all Austro-Hungarian fronts and officially
put an end to all hostilities between Austria-Hungary and the Allied and
Associated Powers (19). However, on November 4, 1918, the Supreme War Council
of the Allies unilaterally cancelled the Padua Armistice without the knowledge
and consent of the Austro-Hungarian
authorities on the grounds that one of the contracting parties to the
Armistice, Austria-Hungary, had ceased to exist. However, this argument had no
validity since the new Hungarian government had also accepted the terms of the
Padua Armistice (20).
Because at that
time Germany was still at war, the presence of German troops in Hungary
prompted the Allies to invade (21). These circumstances proved favorable for
the territorial claims of the Czechs, Serbians, and Rumanians. On November 13,
1918, the Allies concluded the
Belgrade Military Convention with Hungary in order to occupy certain Southern
and Eastern parts of that country (22). This was meant only as a temporary
measure which was not supposed to change the Hungarian administration in the
occupied regions (23). However, the Czechs, Serbians, and Rumanians violated
the Belgrade Convention by occupying more territory than they were authorized
to and by replacing the local Hungarian administration by their own (24).
Hungarian sovereignty and territorial integrity were thus violated after that
state had concluded a legal agreement for the termination of the war. In this
respect, it is interesting to note that on January 24, 1919, the Supreme Allied
Council declared that its members were
“deeply disturbed by the news which
comes to them of
the many instances in which armed force
is being made
use of, in many parts of Europe to gain
possession of
territory, the rightful claim to which
the Peace Con-
ference is to be asked to determine.
They deem it their
duty to utter a solemn warning that
possession gained
by force will seriously prejudice the
claims of those
who use such means. It will create the
presumption
that those who employ force doubt the
justice and va-
lidity of their claim and purpose to
substitute pos-
session for proof of right and set up
sovereignty by
coercion rather than by racial or
national preference
and natural historical association.” (25)
Nevertheless, as
a result of the violation of the Padua Armistice by the Allies, large parts of
Hungary's territory remained under foreign occupation, and those territories
were subsequently annexed by the successor states - Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia,
Rumania.
Several factors
contributed to the extent of Hungary's losses after the war. Having fought on
Germany's side, Hungary was considered and treated as a defeated enemy power by
the Allies (26). Consequently, the successor states were given preferential
treatment regarding their claims against Hungary. The foreign invasion of
Hungary precipitated the economic and political collapse of that country which
had also demobilized its army following the Armistice, thereby facilitating the
advance of enemy troops into Hungarian territory. As a result of the ensuing
chaotic conditions, a coup installed the communist regime of Béla Kun, a turn
of events which prompted further Allied intervention in Hungary, resulting in
the occupation of Budapest by Rumanian troops (27), and causing losses
estimated at 6.5 billion Swiss Francs (28).
The other major
concern of the Allies, besides Germany, was the Russian Revolution of 1917 and
the resulting threat of the spread of Communism:
“The Allied decision to embrace
officially the "New
Europe" plan had a great deal to do
with the loss of
Russia as an ally following the
Bolshevik Revolution
in October 1917... exiles from
Austria-Hungary sudden-
ly became more precious than ever before
in the propa-
ganda war agaist the Central
Powers.”(29)
Hungary was thus
in a particularly unfavorable set of circumstances where its interests were
subordinated to the intervening interests of major powers, especially those of
France, which was taking an increasingly hegemonic role in East Central Europe.
It was under such circumstances that Rumania took over the Eastern part of
Hungary, including historical Transylvania, as a reward for Rumanian assistance
against the Russian Red Army (30).
Another factor
which determined the extent of Hungarian territorial losses to neighboring
states such as Rumania, was the general lack of knowledge or interest among
Western statesmen concerning facts pertaining to Central and Eastern Europe,
combined with the particularly unfavorable image of Hungary created by the
propaganda campaigns of the successor states:
“reminiscing over Hungary's punishment
at the Paris
Peace Conference, the British diplomat
Harold Nicolson
noted: "I confess that I regarded,
and still regard,
that Turanian tribe with acute distaste.
Like their
cousins the Turks, they had destroyed
much and created
nothing." This Allied participant
at the Paris Peace
Conference did more than just express
his unflattering
opinion of the Hungarian people. He
captured the biased
political atmosphere of the
international setting in
which the historical Hungarian state met
its death.” (31)
It is therefore a
fact that the anti-Hungarian propaganda campaign
had a
considerable impact in terms of major power policy towards
Hungary. This has
also been a determining factor in the subsequent
treatment of the
Hungarian minorities.
The Treaty of
Trianon was not negotiated but merely imposed upon Hungary by force:
“what Trianon effected in actual fact
was quite simply
to endorse and legalize the occupations
by conquest,
achieved after the cessation of
hostilities, by the
armed forces of the so-called successor
states, in
stark violation of the armistice
agreements concluded
with the Allied and Associated Powers.”
(32)
The new borders
of Hungary were determined on the basis of claims and information presented by
the parties interested in the territorial dismemberment of Hungary. Hungary's
objections and demands for plebiscites were not taken into consideration at the
Peace Conference (33). In this manner, all ethnic, historical, geographical,
strategic, and economic considerations were applied discriminatorily in favor
of the successor states and to the detriment of Hungary in the determination of
the new frontiers (34).
The Hungarians
reluctantly agreed to sign the Treaty of Trianon, but only with the
understanding that the possibility of future revision was open (the so-called
Millerand letter) and that the acquisition of Hungarian territories by the
successor states was conditional upon the latter's compliance with the treaties
for the protection of national minorities (35). However, neither of these
guarantees were respected by the Allies and the successor states (36).
All this was
accomplished under the claim of serving justice and of realizing the ideals
proclaimed by the Allies (President W. Wilson's 14 Points for the
self-determination of the nationalities of Central and Eastern Europe).
However, the terms and the methods of implementation of the Treaty of Trianon
were in contradiction with the principles in the name of which the Allies
claimed to have fought:
“According to those principles
"peoples and provinces
are not to be bartered about from
sovereignty to sove-
reignty as if they were mere chattels
and pawns in a
game", but "every territorial
settlement involved must
be made in the interest and for the
benefit of the po-
pulation concerned", and also "upon the basis of free
acceptance of that settlement by the
people immediately
concerned".” (37)
As a result, 3.5
million Hungarians were placed against their will in a minority status in the
successor states (38). With only one exception where the outcome proved
favorable to Hungary (the
Sopron
plebiscite), the populations of the transferred territories were not consulted
as to which state they wished to belong to:
“The Treaty of Trianon violated the principle
of self-
determination... The peoples living on
the territories
severed from Hungary did not constitute
themselves
separate political units. No action on
the part of
these peoples can be regarded as
representing a wish
either to break away from Hungary, or to form indepen-
dent units. The so-called Rumanian,
Slovak and Serb
"National Councils" which were
set up in certain towns
had no justification whatever to
consider themselves
representative of the whole population
in the sense
that they had the right to decide
anything in the name
of that population. They had never been
elected; they
were self-constituted bodies.” (39)
The arguments
used in order to justify the Treaty of Trianon were that Hungary was
responsible for W. W. I. and that the millenial existence of the Hungarian
state represented in itself an injustice (40).
In the Dual
Monarchy, decisions relating to diplomatic and military matters were taken in
Vienna (41). In July 1914, the Hungarian government was firmly opposed to the
aggressive Habsburg policy towards Serbia (42). However, the Hungarian
objections were overruled by the Austrians, and Hungary was forced to accept
the decisions taken by the Habsburg government. The accusation that Hungary was
responsible for the war is therefore questionable:
“When the Crown Council decided for war,
Hungary had no
other course than to stand by her
obligations as an ally.
But if there is any nation whose responsible
leaders
were against the war, it is Hungary, and
the guilt of
engineering the war can certainly not be
laid to her
charge.” (43)
The
responsibility for W. W. I lies, in varying degrees, with the Habsburgs,
Russia, Germany, France, as well as Serbia, all of which pursued expansionist
or revanchist policies. Unlike such states as Rumania, Hungary had no
territorial ambitions. Territorial and hegemonic expansionism were among the
main causes of the war.
The other
accusation levelled against Hungary, that of the injustice of that state's
millenial existence, referred to the alleged thousand years of Hungarian
oppression of the national minorities. The implication of this accusation was
that the Carpathian Basin was already occupied by non-Hungarian populations
before the arrival of the Magyars, in 895 AD, who then supposedly subjugated
the previously settled inhabitants of the region. These claims of the successor
states represented the principal justifications of their territorial
acquisitions from Hungary.
These accusations
raise the Nationalities Question of pre-war Hungary, referring to the problems
between the Hungarian and non-Hungarian ethnic groups living in Hungary. The
origins of this problem are of particular importance to this study due to the
fact that this problem is still present under the form of the Hungarian
minorities in the states surrounding Hungary. It is therefore important to
examine the roots of these ethnic conflicts which, to a considerable extent,
have determined, among others, the Transylvanian Question, and have thus been
influential factors in Rumanian nationality policy.
Hungary's
neighbors claimed that they had inhabited the Carpathian Basin before the
Hungarians, and that therefore they had the historical right of possession of
its territories (44). The Rumanians, for their part, based their historical
claims on the so-called Daco-Roman continuity theory. This highly controversial
theory is still the subject of extremely divided opinions (45). While the
Hungarians maintain that the theory of Daco-Roman continuity is not
substantiated by any conclusive evidence (46),
“The Roumanians claim with passion that
their ancestors
have, on the contrary, inhabited
Transylvania, in un-
broken continuity, since its days of
Roman greatness,
having been merely ousted from their
heritage by the
barbaric, Asiatic Magyar intruders... We
do not know
for certain that Roumanians were in
Transylvania in the
year A.D. 1000... they cannot have been
either numerous
or important, neither can they have
possessed any orde-
red social or political society... nor
do we find any
record even of isolated groups...” (47)
In fact, the
historical claims of the successor states appear to be questionable:
“Up to the sixteenth century there is no
historical evi-
dence that alien races in any
considerable strength lived
next to the Magyars in the territory of
pre-war Hungary.
Apart from a moderate immigration of
German and Slovak
settlers and Wallach (Rumanian)
herdsmen, which began
slowly about the thirteenth century, the
population of
the country was overwhelmingly
Magyar.
The change in the ethnographical
composition of the
country from the original homogeneous
Magyar into a
heterogeneous one is... chiefly the
result of quite
recent immigration.” (48)
With respect to
the question of historical rights for territorial possession based on priority
of settlement, it is interesting to note that some of the most recent
researches into the ancient history of Europe have arrived to the conclusion
that before the appearance of the Indo-European peoples in Europe,
non-Indo-European peoples had already laid the foundations of European
civilization (49). These conclusions are supported by archeological finds, such
as that made in Transylvania in 1961 which indicates that the earliest
civilized settlements in the Carpathian Basin were of Mesopotamian Sumerian
origin (50).
During the 19th
c., British, French, and German researchers discovered the most ancient
civilization, that of the Sumerians, in Mesopotamia, and deciphered their
language, coming to the conclusion that the Sumerians were neither Semitic, nor
Indo-European (51). Comparative linguistic analysis has shown that the language
closest to Sumerian is Hungarian (52).
The evidence
therefore suggests that the ancestors of the present-day Hungarians had
established themselves in the Carpathian Basin as early as the Neolithic
period, well before the arrival of the Magyars in 895 AD, who represented the
last major link in the Scythian-Hun-Avar-Magyar continuity of Turanian peoples
which amalgamated with their ethno-linguistic relatives of Near Eastern origin
previously settled in the Danubian region. It should also be mentioned, in
connection with the Daco-Roman theory, that according to Roman sources, the
Dacians, who inhabited today's Transylvania, belonged to the family of Scythian
peoples, which also included the Huns, Avars, and Magyars (53).
However, during
the centuries of warfare and foreign occupation, starting with the Turkish
invasion and division of Hungary, a considerable shift in the ethnic
distribution of the population of the Carpathian Basin took place. While the
Hungarian population suffered comparatively greater losses, other ethnic groups
from the Balkans and Eastern Europe sought refuge or were settled by foreign
rulers in the depopulated areas of Hungary (54), thus considerably reducing the
proportion of Hungarians in Hungary, while the non-Hungarian population grew
more rapidly due to immigration and due to the fact that the areas they
inhabited were less exposed to devastation than those inhabited by Hungarians
(55). Transylvania was also affected by these trends as an increasing influx of
Rumanians took place, starting in the 13th c., as a result of the Mongol and
Turkish invasions of Eastern Europe and the Balkans (56).
The various
nationalities of the Carpathian Basin coexisted
peacefully until
the Habsburgs introduced their policy of inciting the various nationalities
settled in Hungary against the Hungarians:
“the policy of the Imperial Government
in Vienna,
which, in order to check Magyar
ambitions towards
freedom and independence, stirred up the
subject
nationalities and used them as a weapon
against
the Hungarians.” (57)
The Habsburgs
pursued a policy of divide and rule in Hungary since their take-over of that
country (58), starting with the partition of Hungary between the Habsburgs and
the Ottomans in the 16th c. This policy consisted essentially in settling large
numbers of foreigners in Hungary, in order to economically exploit and
politically divide Hungary to the Austrian Habsburgs's advantage:
“It is estimated that in the course of
the XVIIIth c.,
the Habsburgs installed or introduced in
Hungary some
400 000 Serbs, 1 200 000 Germans, and 1
500 000 Ruma-
nians and thus lowered the proportion of
Magyars in
the historic Kingdom, that had totalled
80 per cent
before the Turkish conquest, to less
than 40% by 1780.” (59)
In order to
incite the foreign nationalities against the Hungarians when the latter
repeatedly revolted against Austrian rule, the Habsburgs fostered the
development of the national self-consciousness of the non-Hungarian
nationalities and directed them against the Hungarians (60).
In this context,
the theory of Daco-Roman continuity was therefore a useful means of mobilizing
the Rumanians against the Hungarians:
“The principal center of this
["Dacian"] idea lay
across the Carpathians in Austrian
territory, where
Roman Catholic propaganda made
considerable progress
among Rumanian-speaking populations.
Official Austrian
support of Catholicism helped to forward
the movement...” (61)
“The aims of this ["Transylvanian
School"] movement
were not primarily scientific. The study
of Rumanian
history and language... was to support a
distinctly
Rumanian political struggle...” (62)
The objective of
this struggle was to re-establish the Rumanian nation "in the position of
pre-eminence" (63) which it was believed to have occupied in ancient
times. As a result, during the 18th and 19th c. Hungarian uprisings against the
Habsburgs, Rumanians settled in Hungary slaughtered entire Hungarian villages,
thereby contributing to the depopulation of Hungarian-inhabited areas and
increasing the Rumanian population's proportion in Transylvania and other parts
of Hungary (64). Due to the Rumanians's siding with the Habsburgs against the
Hungarians (65), the relations between these two nationalities deteriorated
considerably during the course of the 19th c.
The nationality
problem which was thus created had serious repercussions in the origins and
aftermath of the First World War. As a consequence of the nationality problem
in Hungary, certain non-Hungarians advanced the claim, mostly under foreign
influence (66), that the Hungarians have been oppressing the nationalities
which have supposedly inhabited the Carpathian Basin before the Hungarians who
subjugated them. These claims have been widely propagated since the latter part
of the 19th c., essentially in order to justify the territorial partition of
Hungary.
However, the
evidence seems to contradict these politically motivated historical claims:
“The administrative and political
organizations of
the Hungarian statehood, based on
autonomy and self-
government, was also the inherited legal
system of
the nomadic tribal life... Thus the
nomadic empires
were built on autonomy and
self-government, and the
concept of discrimination against
different racial
or language groups was unknown.
This principle of self-government and
tolerance to-
ward foreign groups, together with the
respect for the
liberty of others, prevailed in the same
way within the
Christian Hungarian Kingdom.” (67)
As a matter of
fact, it was in Transylvania that religious freedom was legalized for the first
time in Europe, in the 16th c. (68)
Furthermore the Hungarian state not only allowed the various ethnic
groups settled in Hungary to preserve their language and culture, but actually
contributed to their cultural and economic development:
“the Magyars lived for centuries in
complete harmony
with their co-nationals of other races
and always fos-
tered their national and cultural
development. Of this,
no better proof can be given than the fact
that all
the minorities of pre-war Hungary not
only maintained
their national characteristics, but
developed them and
grew in strength and wealth to an
incomparably greater
extent than did their kinsfolk in
Serbia, Wallachia, and
Moldavia.” (69)
Rumanian
historians have interpreted the peasant rebellions against the Hungarian feudal
regime as Rumanian national uprisings against Hungarian tyranny. This is a
misinterpretation since the Hungarian nobility was not exclusively of Hungarian
origin (70) and ethnic Hungarians constituted the bulk of the exploited
peasantry. It was therefore a case of feudal socio-economic conflict and not a
manifestation of conscious ethno-linguistic discrimination (71).
The Rumanians and
other nationalities have also claimed that they have been the victims of a
systematic campaign of forced Magyarization, or Hungarianization. In relation
to this claim, it should be noted that the so-called "Magyar
Chauvinism" for which Hungary was
criticized was a manifestation characterizing a small and unrepresentative
minority of the Hungarian population, namely the upper and middle classes
which, to a considerable extent, were composed of elements of non-Hungarian
origin (72). This important fact seems to have been overlooked by Hungary's
critics, such as R.W. Seton-Watson (Racial Problems in Hungary), who
made the mistake of accusing the Hungarian nation as a whole for the policies
of the reactionary oligarchy in power at the time. Hungary's ruling classes exploited
Hungarian nationalism for similar political reasons as later Rumanian
governments exploited Rumanian nationalism. It is also a fact that “the
Hungarian policy towards the racial minorities within pre-war Hungary was far
from being such as has been alleged in anti-Hungarian propaganda.” (73)
The evidence
seems to suggest that Hungarianization occurred essentially as a natural and
gradual assimilation of the immigrants into the more developed Hungarian
society, just as most immigrants from Europe tend to assimilate into the
dominant North American Anglo-Saxon culture:
“Moreover, some nations... do possess an
active power
of attraction which enables them easily
to absorb
alien elements, while others are
passive, yielding
readily to assimilation... few, if any
nations in